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Evaluating Scientific and
Forensic Evidence
Richard H. Underwoodt
Abstract
Professor Underwood offers a critique of the present state ofscientific
and forensic evidence. In the context of discussing four challenges to
the field, the author arms the practitioner with strategies and tactics for
making effective use ofscientific and forensic testimony.
I. Introduction
In this short Article I would like to comment on some of the challenges
presented by the flood of expert testimony in our courts. My views are
directed to practitioners, although my original drafts were directed to law
teachers who might be interested in developing course materials on
scientific and forensic evidence. In this case, at least, the curriculum and
actual practice have met-a happy coincidence!
I have taught a basic course on evidence law for twenty years, written
a handbook on the law of evidence,' and taught trial advocacy courses
to students and practicing lawyers.2 Still, I must admit that the introduc-
tion of new techniques and even entirely new disciplines has left me in
t B.S. (1969), J.D. (1976) The Ohio State University. The author is the Spears-
Gilbert Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law.
A version of this Article was originally prepared for presentation at The Second
World Conference On New Trends In Criminal Investigation AndEvidence, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, Dec. 10-15, 1999, sponsored by the International Network for Research
on (the Law of) Evidence and Procedure (INREP).
I RICHARD UNDERWOOD & GLEN WEISSENBERGER, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW
COURTROOM MANUAL (Anderson, updated yearly).
2 For many years the University of Kentucky CLE program offered a Nine-Day
Intensive Course on Trial Advocacy. The course was offered to practicing lawyers in
the early Summer, before the start ofour regular Summer school session. Unfortunately,
the program became too costly for a self-supporting CLE program. Fortunately, with
some funding and assistance from Kentucky's Attorney General, the Law School plans
to update its courtroom facilities and offer a new Prosecutor's "training school" during
our Fall semester.
HeinOnline  -- 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 149 2000-2001
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
the position of playing catch-up.' I should also admit up front that, like
many lawyers, I am more or less pre-Copemican in my education, train-
ing, and experience. I have no formal training in the forensic sciences,
and no experience as a prosecutor. My somewhat limited practice had
been in civil litigation, and oddly enough, most of my research and
writing has been in the area of professional ethics.4 I came by my new-
found interest in scientific evidence and forensics, not because of any
scientific or prosecutorial bent, but because I have spent a lot of time
rubbing elbows with a number of local physicians and scientists who have
been kind enough to assist me in teaching a survey course in Legal
Medicine.5 Suddenly, I had to become conversant with such esoteric
topics as genetic testing and DNA-a "brave new world" for me.6 I
became aware of the need to prepare young lawyers to be skeptical ofand
challenge scientific evidence and professed expertise when I was writing
a series of articles on the law of perjury.' In those articles I addressed the
' In the last few years, several law school journals have offered useful symposia.
See Symposium, Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13 CARDOZOL.REV. 253 (1991);
Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death ofFrye: Criminal Forensics and DNA
Evidence, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 1959-97 (1994). The University of California at Davis
sponsored a Scientific Evidence Symposium that was inspired by the first INREP
conference. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Foreword, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941-49 (1997).
4 RICHARD UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS (1988); WILLIAM
FORTUNE, RICHARD UNDERWOOD & EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, MODERN LITIGATION AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1996); UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, CLE, KENTUCKY
LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DESK BOOK (Richard Underwood
ed., 1993). I served as the Chairman of the Kentucky Bar Association Ethics and Ethics
Hotline Committees for fourteen years.
' I am particularly indebted to the many fine physicians and scientists from the
College of Medicine, University of Kentucky, and from the University of Kentucky
Chandler Medical Center, as well as the scientists and technicians working at the
Kentucky State Police Crime Laboratory, and investigators in the Lexington-Fayette
County, Kentucky, Police Department, all of whom have volunteered their time. Qui
docet discit.
6See Richard Underwood & Ron Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing, and the Specter
ofDiscrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases, 85 KY. L.J. 665 (1996-97).
' See, e.g., Richard Underwood, The Professional and the Liar, 87 KY. L.J. 919
(1999) [hereinafter The Liar]; Richard Underwood, Perjury! The Charges & Defenses,
36 DUQUESNE L. REV. 715 (1998); Richard Underwood, Perjury: An Anthology, 13
ARIZ. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 307; Richard Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the HotIron
to the Lie Detector, 84 KY. L.J. 597 (1995-96); Richard Underwood, "X-Spurt"
[Vol. 24:149
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problems of false expert testimony, police perjury, and prosecutorial
misconduct. Although the reader may suspect that my professional
environment is somewhat cloistered, I suggest that some of the things I
have learned along the way about scientific and forensic evidence may
be of practical use to many lawyers.
II. Some of the Challenges
I group the challenges facing scientific evidence under four headings-
system or control problems, accuracy problems, honesty problems, and
lawyer skills problems. These are merely convenient, descriptive labels.
Needless to say, these broad categories overlap.
There is also nothing original about my selection of these categories.9
As Professor Imwinkelried notes, as the use of scientific testimony
accelerates, "we are gaining alarming insights into the level of scientific
misanalysis .... [Sometimes] the source of error is reliance on an
inadequately validated theory. [system or control problems] ... In other
cases, the cause of the error is sloppy test procedure"'" [accuracy
problems]. Other commentators have pointed out the obvious but often
overlooked fact that the science may be valid but the expert witness may
Witnesses, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 343 (1995) [hereinafter "X-Spurt" Witnesses];
Richard Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer's History of the Law ofPerjury, 10ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215 (1993).
' Indeed, some of my interest in current issues in scientific and forensic evidence
rubbed off on our CLE Director. See Course materials: Scientific, Technical and
Forensic Evidence, UK/CLE, September 4, 2000, which includes extensive materials
on the law of expert testimony, DNA, blood alcohol determinations, accident
reconstructions, document examination and handwriting analysis, firearms, ballistics
and toolmarks, medical examiners and forensic pathology, deception detection and the
polygraph, scientific evidence in civil cases, etc. For a new piece expressing views
consistent with mine, see Scott Bales, Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic
Scientists, 26 LITIG., no. 2, at 51 (Winter 2000).
9 See, e.g., Andre Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some
Words of Caution, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1993) (providing a longer list of
reasons to be cautious in accepting medical and other scientific evidence in criminal
cases, all of which could be gathered under my headings).
0 Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 941-42.
2000)
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be biased, conflicted, or dishonest" [honesty problems]. My lawyer skills
category recognizes that many times lawyers default" on their profes-
sional obligation to challenge the evidence. If practitioners keep these
categories in mind, they may get a better angle on ways to present or
attack scientific evidence.
Although this short sketch suggests the possibilities that test results
may be inaccurate, that some forensic scientists may be over-zealous or
manipulated by their prosecutorial "customers," and that some "experts"
may be down-right dishonest, I need to add a word of caution. Most of
the time the test results will be accurate, and the forensic scientists will
be honest and professional. Counsel must, as a professional, be skeptical
ofthe opposition and do his homework and discovery. But in many cases
the decision not to confront the forensic evidence and the forensic
scientist directly will be the correct decision.
A. System or Control Problems
The control problems revolve around the need for useful testimony
from the expert witness, but also the desire for the witness to avoid
advocacy. The witness should not exert too great an influence and usurp
the function of the trier of fact.13 As philosopher C.A.J. Coady puts it,
"[one] can concede the important, even essential, role of the expert
witness... [and yet worry about] whether the vastly increased role of
experts in the law poses a threat to the proper exercise of the court's
arbitral role."' 4
" See, e.g., "X-Spurt" Witnesses, supra note 7, at 343; Paul Giannelli, The Abuse
ofScientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Labora-
tories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 467-68 (1997).
2 Sometimes lawyers do not challenge the evidence for a reason, even when it is
challengeable. A lawyer's judgment on a tactical point may be the "right" judgment,
and yet leave scientist and layman alike disappointed. See also Cyril H. Wecht, Legal
Medicine and Forensic Science: Parameters of Utilization in Criminal Cases, 34 DUQ.
L. REV. 797, 807-08 (1996).
11 C.A.J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 289 (1992). The control
problems were described and lamented by Learned Hand in a famous article. Learned
Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 50-52 (1901-02).
14 COADY, supra note 13, at 300.
[Vol. 24:149
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One suspects that control problems are perceived to be more worri-
some where the law operates through an adversary system. 5 Coady
describes the relationship between the law and expert testimony in
English law as a "shotgun marriage" in which the men of law have
attempted to keep the expert in a "subordinate role." He suggests that
the tensions maybe more aggravated in America, where "the relationship
[between the law and expert testimony] seems more like open concubi-
IS Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414 (1952).
[M]uch might be gained from the inquisitorial practice by having the experts
exchange the information which they had with each other and then determine the
conclusions to be drawn. With the rise of the adversary system in which witnesses
were looked upon as being called by the parties and expected to represent their
position in the case, it was not surprising that the use of scientific proof developed
into a testimonial battle of experts.
Id.; see also IAN FRECKELTON, THE TRIAL OF THE EXPERT: A STUDY OF EXPERT
EVIDENCE AND FORENSIC EXPERTS, Foreward by Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby, C.M.G., at
ix, xii, & 132 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press 1987); Hand, supra note 13, at 56
("[The jury] will do no better with the so-called testimony of experts than without, except
where it is unanimous. If the jury must decide between [conflicting experts] they are
as badly off as if they had none to help."); Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and
Scientific Disagreement, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1072 (1997). Cf. Petra van
Kampen & Hans Nijboer, Daubert in the Lowlands, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 951, 985
(1997).
[U]nder Dutch law[,] both culturally and institutionally... [t]he expert is primarily
an assistant to the court... [and] ... expertise and experts have been regarded in
terms of neutrality and impartiality .... In the Dutch legal system, experts are
expected to solve disagreements among themselves and not bring them into the open.
Thej oint report that follows their negotiation catches two flies at once; it legitimizes
reliance upon experts in light of the perceived impartiality and neutrality of their
arguments, and it prevents potential conflicts from disrupting the proceedings.
Id. As Dutch authorities suggest, "the American legal system's involvement with these
cases and its struggle to stop the flood of unreliable scientific expert evidence, a struggle
ofwhich Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) is repre-
sentative, seems to have fewparallels in the western world." Kampen & Nijboer, supra,
at 955; see also John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823,835 (1985) (stating that, in Germany, the experts "are thought of as judge's
aides"). For evidence that the "junk science" problem is real in the United States and
in Conmonwealth countries, see David Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States
and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'LL. 123 (1996); Paul C. Giannelli, "Junk Sci-
ence": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1993).
2000]
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nage, with all the shifting complexities of power and dominance that
image suggests." 6
The adversary system, adversary politics, and adversary rhetoric
complicate things. At the risk of sounding like an enemy of the adversary
system (I am not), and at the risk of sounding overly simplistic (I maybe),
I think there is something to the following. If my stereotyping offends,
so be it.
In America, lawyers can be grouped into sociological and political
camps.' 7 One camp consists of plaintiffs' lawyers in civil cases. This
is a large and increasingly well organized group that knows how to get
its points across. Conservative politicians refer to this group as "The Trial
Lawyers."'" The second camp consists of defense lawyers in civil cases.
This group is less organized than the first, and probably smaller in
number. Civil defense lawyers support and are supported by corporations
and insurance companies.' 9 Then there are the prosecutors (and other
government lawyers-lawyers in enforcement agencies, such as the FDA
and EPA,20 who use scientific evidence) at the state and federal level, and
their opposites, the criminal defense lawyers. There are more criminal
defense lawyers in the private bar than there are prosecutors. I suggest
16 COADY, supra note 13, at 277.
7 For example, note the hostility expressed by a spokesman for the plaintiffs bar
in the Preface to the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct:
[The draft Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the product of] ... the sort of
thinking you get from a commission made up of lawyers who work for institutional
clients, in institutional firms, and who have lost site of the lawyer's basic function.
Lawyers are not licensed to write prospectuses for giant corporations, or to haggle
with federal agencies over regulations and operating rights. We are licensed to
represent people in court, which often means people in trouble with the law, and with
the government. We are the citizens' champions against official tyranny.
AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT preface (Revised Draft May 1982).
" Lawyer-bashers associate the group with hot-button code words like "contingent
fee" and "entrepreneurial" litigation. For critics of "junk science" like Peter Huber, the
"trial lawyers" are purveyors of"junk scholarship." See Galileo 's Retort: Peter Huber's
Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1637 n.167 (1993).
," Lawyer-bashers like to think this group consists of corporate lackeys who
specialize in delay and feed from the "billable hour machine."
20 See EDITH EFRON, THE APOCALYPTICS 221 (1984) (addressing the alleged abuse
of "junk" or "regulatory" science by government lawyers).
[Vol. 24:149
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that the numbers favor the plaintiffs' bar on the civil side and the defense
bar on the criminal side. Judges do not exactly let lawyers vote on what
the rules should be, however, and where the actual power of persuasion
lies is not clear. Furthermore, the locus of power changes over timejust
as judicial attitudes change over time. My point is that America has a free
and independent bar, but lawyers of these particular feathers do flock
together, philosophically and politically.
The forces on opposite sides of the "v." have different ideas about the
desirability of limits on the introduction of scientific evidence. The civil
plaintiffs' bar wants a loose standard for the admission of scientific
evidence-the plaintiffs' lawyers would prefer that the question be one of
evidentiary weight or sufficiency. Presumably, they would like the
Daubert2 ' problem to be treated as a Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b)
problem.22 The civil defense lawyers want a strict, Frye-type standard,23
and want the court to treat the problem as a Rule 104(a) problem.
Alternatively, the prosecutors want a liberal standard of admissibility, or
at least a standard that will apply in the same way24 to both the prosecu-
tion and the defense. On the other hand, the criminal defense lawyers
want a strict, Frye-type standard to be applied to the prosecution, but want
a more liberal standard or no standard at all to be applied to the defense.25
All of these contending groups advance plausible arguments in support
of their positions; and the language of Daubert is sufficiently cryptic to
give each group some comfort.26 So the fight over the meaning of
2 Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.
2d 469 (1993).
22 See Eileen A. Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses:
Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1152-59 (1998) (offering a thoughtful discussion of the difference
between Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 104(b) approaches).
23 Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
14 They like the "sauce rule": "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander."
25 See, e.g., Ephraim Margolin, Daubert: Comments on the Scientific Evidence
Symposium, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1249 (1997). Cf Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric
Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 54-
56 (1998).
26See G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its EssentialDilemma,
andit's Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939,953 (1996) (stating, "[tlhis is the dilemma
of Daubert: Daubert is at the same time both more restrictive of expert evidence and
less restrictive of expert evidence") (emphasis added).
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 155 2000-2001
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
Daubert rages on. I invite anyone who questions my admittedly stereo-
typical observations about the politics of the situation to read the
contentious literature that appeared following the publication of the
Federal Judicial Center's "Daubert Handbook., 27
This choosing of sides between the Daubert- and Frye-type standards
was exhibited before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael.28 I call Kumho Tire a "My Cousin Vinny"2 9 case.
The plaintiff in Kumho Tire was trying to make a case against a tire
manufacturer by offering the testimony of a "tire failure expert," who
would have testified that a defect in a tire's manufacture or design caused
a blow-out and a fatal accident.30 After holding a "Daubert hearing," the
trial judge refused to admit the testimony, finding that it was not reliable,
and alluding to some of the Daubert guidelines.3' I think the testimony
was weak by anyone's standards-except, of course, the standards of the
plaintiff and his lawyer.32 The policy question is whether we want to let
this kind of evidence "come in for what it is worth" or have a "judicial
gatekeeper" screen it out. The trial judge's nostrils and Daubert told the
27 See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Plaintiffs'Lawyers Rap Evidence Manual, 81 A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1995, at 20; see also "X-Spurt" Witnesses, supra note 7, at 351-52.
28 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999).
29 In the movie by the same name a novice defense lawyer was representing his
cousin, who had been charged with murdering a convenience store clerk. MY COUSIN
VINNY (Tri Mark 1992). The defendant was saved when the lawyer's girlfriend, an auto
mechanic, took the stand and provided convincing technical evidence that incriminating
skid marks left at the scene could not have been left by the defendant's car.
3oKumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 137.
3'Id. at 137-38. The Daubert Court set forth several guidelines in determining
reliability of scientific theories and techniques including: testing, peer review, error
rates, and general acceptance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
32 Nothing fosters belief like self interest. The expert conceded that the allegedly
defective tire had been in use so long that some of the tread was bald; the tire should
have been taken out of service; the tire had been inadequately repaired for punctures,
and it bore marks indicative of abuse rather than defect. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 143.
The expert sidestepped all of this by advancing a theory shared by no one else in the
industry, and unsupported in the literature, that there needed to be at least two signs of
abuse. Id. at 145. 1 think that it is not too extreme a suggestion to characterize the
opinion as self-sealing advocacy rather than helpful testimony. The expert sees only
what he needs to support his argument, and responds to embarrassing or inconvenient
facts by thinking up some new, untested theory.
[Vol. 24:149
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judge that he did not have to let the jury hear the expert's testimony. The
plaintiff insisted that the evidence was not scientific testimony, but
instead technical or skills testimony, and that the Daubert criteria should
not have been used to judge its reliability. The appellate court agreed
with the plaintiff and reversed. The case then went to the United States
Supreme Court.
Before Kuhmo Tire was decided, proponents of forensic evidence in
criminal cases, and the plaintiffs' lawyers in civil cases, were arguing that
the Daubert criteria are actually more liberal than Frye (a plausible
argument), and that in any event their application should be limited to
cases involving pure science, or at least some kind of science, as opposed
to practical or technical skill (a less plausible argument).33 The Supreme
Court's decision in Kuhmo Tire surprised the commentators by rejecting
any "scientific versus technical" dichotomy.34 I did not find the Court's
decision the least bit surprising or reactionary, but perhaps that is because
I did not read that much into the Daubert decision in the first place.
While Justice Blackmun may have been more comfortable than most
judges and lawyers when it came to rubbing elbows with scientists35 and
reasoning in terms that seemed scientific,36 his judicial opinions did not
"do" science. Justice Blackmun did not provide, and could not have
provided, a (dare I say it?) litmus test. Although he used a great number
" See also Michael Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons From the Law's Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1133-34
(1998) (noting that, "[i]ronically, as a result of Starzecpyzel and its progeny, it can be
said that courts had once admitted handwriting identification expertise because they
believed it was scientifically well-founded and well-tested, while now they admit it
because they know it is scientifically unfounded and untested"). Cf United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (The court instructed the jury:
"Forensic document examiners may be of assistance to you. However, their skill is
practical in nature, and despite anything you may hear or have heard, it does not have
the demonstrable certainty that some sciences have. ... I amnot in any way suggesting
what you should do.").
34 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 137 (applying Daubert factors to technical and scientific
testimony).
31 Justice Blackmun had been counsel to the Mayo Clinic.
36 agree with those commentators who argue that, in the real world, falsifiability
may not be of that much use as a judicial tool for distinguishing good science frombad.
See, e.g., Redmayne, supra note 15, at 1078-79.
20001
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of words to get his point across,37 arguably all he was saying in Daubert
was that in some circumstances the trial judge has discretion, and the
judge should exercise that discretion to prevent thejury from hearing the
expert's testimonybecause the expert is just too "far out." WhileDaubert
offered criteria or considerations rooted in Justice Blackmun's notion of
what science is, these criteria may not be that special.3" Science may not
be that heretical9 after all.
In any event, I think it was predictable that the Daubert Court would
express time-honoredj udicial views about the control problems and pick
the Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) route as one4" means of maintaining
judicial control over the expert and the jury, while also maintaining that
a resort to Frye alone would result in the exclusion of too much expert
testimony. Still, Frye had the virtue of allowing the trial judge to base
his Rule 104(a) decision on what the scientists think about a science.
After Daubert, judges may have to make their own judgment about the
reliability of the expert's science. "By a preponderance of the evidence,
the proponent of the expert evidence has to demonstrate to the judge that
it is good evidence, perhaps in spite of what other experts think about
it."'" This sounds good, but it may be a rather daunting task in particular
cases. The judge must decide
See James McElhaney, Trial Notebook." Fixing the Expert Mess, LITIG., Fall 1993,
at 53, 54 (discussing the Daubert majority's standard for admitting scientific evidence
and that the Court "found" the word "science" implies a grounding in scientific methods
and procedures and the word "knowledge" means something more than a subjective
belief or unsupported speculation).
3 "The correct methodology of science is the correct methodology of civilization,
too." PAUL JOHNSON, ENEMIES OF SOCIETY 145 (1977).
39 But see ALAN H. CROMER, UNCOMMON SENSE: THE HERETICAL NATURE OF
SCIENCE (1993).
40 The "ultimate issue" rule was another control device, but it has largely been
abandoned in American jurisdictions, except insofar as psychiatric and psychological
experts are concerned. See FED. R. EvID. 704(b); see also Scallen & Wiethoff, supra
note 22, at 1166 (discussing the John Hindey case-attempted assassination of Ronald
Reagan-and the amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 704, which otherwise abolished
the "ultimate issue" rule, and the Dan White murder case-the so-called "Twinkie"
defense case-and subsequent amendment of the California Penal Code); FRECKLELTON,
supra note 15, at 68-81.
4 Fenner, supra note 26, at 948.
[Vol. 24:149
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at least three questions: (1) whether the witness is indeed expert in the field;
(2) whether the field is a genuine area of science; (3) whether, given a
positive answer to (1) and (2), his particular depositions are credible. ....
All three of these questions pose difficulty for a legal tribunal since they
seem to be questions that only an expert can answer. Hence the specter of
a vicious logical regress arises.42
This logical regress might be avoided if we opted for some procedural
"reform" based on the European model, or referred the matter to some
certifying body or institution. 3 Of course, such reforms might present
their own problems, 44 and most elements of the bar would oppose such
"reforms."
In cases involving nascent, novel, or neo-science,
41 the "soft" social4 6
or psychological sciences, 47 or non-scientific technical or skills experts,
the judge may have to hold a Daubert hearing. 4 The Daubert case
perpetuates the problem of logical regress, sets up the need for a new form
of mini-trial, and offers yet another stage for the adversary rhetoricians.
My prediction is that, in civil cases, Daubert hearings will result in
additional delay and litigation cost. At least for the time being, the
42 COADY, supra note 13, at 281.
43 See id. at 282-83; see also Gary N. McAbee, Improper Expert Medical Testimony:
Existing and Proposed Mechanisms of Oversight, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 257 (1998).
" See Alex Kozinski, Brave New World, 30 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 997, 1010 (1997)
(questioning whether, in the Dutch system, the experts do not, in effect, become the
judges who operate in secret).
45 COADY, supra note 13, at 291-94.
"See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993) (offering an
interesting discussion on the injection of so-called "junk social science" into appellate
briefs).
47 Coady offers cogent criticisms of the appearance of the witnesses ofpsychology,
sociology, and anthropology. See COADY, supra note 13, chs. 15 & 16, at 262-303; see
also Charles P. Ewing, Yes.: Good Lawyering Can Weed Out Unscientific Testimony,
83 A.B.A. J. 76 (1997) (alluding to John Grisham's novelA Time to Kill, in which both
the prosecution and the defense present fraudulent expert testimony).
"' But see Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492,498 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that
the trial court is not required to hold an actual hearing to comply with Daubert); see also
Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931,937 (Ky. 1999) (holding RFLP and PCR
DNA testing admissible in future without Daubert hearing).
2000]
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defense bar will over-litigate Daubert issues. Will the Daubert hearing
eliminate "junk science" or will it turn out to be yet another negative
development in civil litigation?49 One thing is for sure-we are going to
see some controversial opinions at the state and federal level, all resulting
from this new judicial enthusiasm for "gatekeeping."
For example, consider the interesting Kentucky opinion in Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, a products liability case against arising
from the plaintiffs injuries that he suffered when he was changing a
multi-piece tire rim manufactured by Goodyear.5 When the plaintiff
mounted a wheel assembly to the axle of a trailer, the assembly exploded
and an FL-type lock ring struck the plaintiff.51 The plaintiff wanted to
offer the testimony of Dr. O.J. Hahn, who would have testified that the
wheel multi-piece tire rim was defectively designed, and a safer technol-
ogy was available.5 2 Dr. Hahn had earned numerous degrees, including
a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from Princeton, and he had taught
mechanical engineering at the University of Kentucky since 1973.: He
had testified as an expert witness on multi-piece rims in over one hundred
cases in forty-nine states, and he had studied this type of rim for twenty-
six years.54 His testimony was based on the application of his knowledge
of engineering principles, and his study of technology from the 1930s
revealed patents used in the aircraft industry, including wheel bolting
systems. 5 These systems were successfully used on B-52s, and Dr. Hahn
'9 Some plaintiffs' lawyers on the civil side argue that Daubert puts them at risk
unfairly. They worry about taking a novel or cutting edge case, investing huge sums
of money on expert witness fees and other litigation expenses, having the case thrown
out by the judge on Daubert grounds (unfairly? by surprise?), and then being sued by
their disappointed client for malpractice. Of course, the counterarguments are that the
"entrepreneur" lawyer takes his or her chances along with the client. The disappointed
client would have to show that, except for negligence in the selection of the expert or
in the preparation or presentation of the expert's testimony, the client would have won
the case.
11 S.W.3d 575, 576 (Ky. 2000).
5' Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 579.
2Id. at 580.
I d. at 583.
'Id. at 584.
" Id. at 580.
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sensibly concluded that a similar bolting system would work on wheel
assemblies on trucks and trailers.56 However, after holding a 104(a)
hearing, the trial court concluded that, because Dr. Hahn had never (1)
used a B-52 system on a truck, (2) submitted his views to any tire
manufacturer, (3) submitted his suggested design for peer review, nor (4)
published his "B-52 bolting theory" in any article, his testimony was not
admissible." Goodyear prevailed on a motion for a directed verdict
because the plaintiff had no other expert testimony to present.5" The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's exercise of discretion.59 Was
this a proper exercise of Daubert gatekeeping power? The dissent
questioned whether it was not more sensible to admit testimony based
on accepted scientific principles of engineering, and let the jury consider
the points made by defendant as matters going to the weight and not the
admissibility of the evidence.' After all, this was no charlatan advancing
new, self-sealing theories. Was the majority of the Supreme Court not
"preoccupied with industrypractices"? 6 Was the trial judge not "confus-
[ing] its role as gatekeeper with the jury's role in determining the weight
evidence should have"? 62
On the criminal side of the house, the defense bar may see Daubert
as an invitation to challenge previously accepted types of forensic evi-
dence.63 My prediction here is that most everything successfully offered
in the past by prosecutors will survive Daubert scrutiny.64 Additionally,
56 Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 580.
17 Id. at 581.
58 Id. at 583.
59 Id. at 584.
6 Id.
6' Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 584.
62 Id. For a fascinating case involving a burnt up body, a BIC lighter, and no obvious
alternative explanation for a source of the fire that consumed the victim, see Pride v.
BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff's expert testimony on cause and
origin of fire excluded after a Daubert hearing).
63 See, e.g., Margolin, supra note 25, at 1254; Randolph Jonakait, The Meaning of
Daubert and What That Meansfor Forensic Science, 15 CARDOZOL. REV. 2103 (1994).
"See Margolin, supra note 25, at 1255 ("Whenthe Supreme Court decided Daubert,
a paroxysm of creative inventiveness seized the criminal defense bar.... Hope seemed
luxuriously victorious over experience."). One of my operating assumptions as an
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defendants will have another weapon to use against their own lawyers
when litigating post-conviction. On appeal defendants could allege that
counsel did not raise the issue or pursue it with enough competence and
zeal.
B. Accuracy Problems
Lawyers,judges, and critics of expert evidence assume that the public
in general, and jurors in particular, accord an "honorific" status to the
expert. 65 Indeed, the time-honored catechism in which the proponent
tenders the expert to the court and receives an acknowledgment from the
judge that the witness may now testify to thejury as an "expert" has been
condemned in a number of American jurisdictions, including my own,
on the theory that jurors can be swept away by any hint of judicial
certification of a witness's authority!
66
American lawyer is that the judge (in state court) is probably a former prosecutor. In
contrast, in federal court, the judge is probably a former Senatorial campaign manager.
For a recent case excluding defense expert testimony concerning the pitfalls of
eyewitness identification on the theory that the expert 's points were within the ordinary
experience ofjurors see Christie v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 968069 (Ky. Ct. App.
2000).
65 Are our assumptions about juror attitudes justified, or are they simply elitist?
Perhaps not all of them are justified. Daniel Shuman et al., Assessing the Believability
of Expert Witnesses: Science in the Jurybox, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 23 (1996). Shuman
devotes a majority of his work to findings that jurors do not give more credence to
experts from hard sciences than those in soft fields. In addition, Shuman notes thatjurors
decide not on the basis of their own characteristics but on the expert's qualifications,
the expert's use of good reasoning, the expert's familiarity with the facts of the case,
and the expert's appearance of impartiality. Id. at 28-30. These findings contradict those
of prior "studies." Even more interesting is the fact that this recent study found that
jurors are influenced by who retained the expert, and that jurors tend to believe the
defense experts in civil cases. Should we reevaluate some of our assumptions about the
inability of jurors to evaluate and discount "junk science"? See also Symposium,
Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts about Trial Court
Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding Expert Scientific
Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619 (1984).
6 See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1111 (1995); Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 216,218 (Ky. 1997). These
opinions make much ado about nothing. See also Charles Richey, Proposals to
Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word "Expert" Under the Federal
Rules Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 554-55 (1994).
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To the degree that an expert can parade as... a scientist.., his opinion
[may] have a weight and authority that it may not deserve, not just because
he may not be a particularly good specimen of "homo scientificus" but also
because what he testifies to may be much more contestable than the
deferential lay person is inclined to believe.67
As previously stated, counsel could challenge many forensic science
procedures if the courts rigorously applied the Daubert criteria. Professor
Jonakait 68 and others69 have argued that some procedures have been
subjected to little orno testing, and that "most of forensic science operates
outside of [any] peer review systems."7 ° Publication is limited. Many
techniques are not used "outside," and may not be generally accepted, at
least by the larger scientific community.
Then there is the problem of "error rate."71 Daubert invites the oppo-
nent of the scientific testimony to make much ado about error rates.
Jonakait claims that "[little is ... known about the true error rates for
almost all forensic science techniques ... [and that] [t]he few disclosed
67 COADY, supra note 13, at 280 (emphasis added).
68 Randolph Jonakait, Forensic Science.: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 109 (1991); Jonakait, supra note 53, at 2103.
69 See, e.g., Moenssens, supra note 9, at 12-13; Paul Giannelli, Book Review, The
DNA Story: An Alternative View, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 380 (1997); see also
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 361 (1991) (noting that
most forensic sciences, including DNA typing, rely on assumptions that have not been
verified by empirical testing). Cf D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and
Nonscience in the Courts; Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 21 (1996) (providing an interesting, if somewhat overheated, point-
counterpoint). Compare Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence
in the Post-Daubert World, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 251 (1997), with D. Michael Risinger,
Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New "Post-Daubert World"-A Reply to
Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998).
70 Jonakait, supra note 63, at 2117.
7' Here I refer to the need to assess real error rates based on the actual use of tech-
niques and procedures. See Jonakait, supra note 63, at 2115-16 (providing a discussion
of the importance of the distinction between actual and theoretical error rates); Margaret
Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens ofScience and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1081 (1997).
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error rates... are shockingly high."72 It is no wonder "the argument that
the testing laboratory might have made an error appears to be the most
fruitful line of attack in DNA cases."73 Indeed, the National Research
Council's report DNA In Forensic Science actually encouraged such
attacks when it initially suggested that the results of laboratory proficiency
testing be used in deciding whether testimony should be admitted.74
Actually "error rate" may refer to more than one thing and may suggest
multiple avenues of attack. What was Justice Blackmun talking about
when he alluded to the importance of "error rate?" Are we to consider
the degree of error inherent in a test or technique even when it is properly
conducted (theoretical accuracy)? Or are we talking about performance
rates on a particular lab's or a particular individual's proficiency tests?
Should an expert be required to combine the probability of a match due
to lab error with the random-match probabilities (RMP)?" Should the
72 Jonakait, supra note 63, at 2117; see also Randolph Jonakait, Stories, Forensic
Science, andImproved Verdicts, 13 CARDOZOL. REV. 343,350-51 (1991) (arguing that
information regarding error rates should be presented to the jury); Richard Lempert,
Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to
the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDOZOL. REV. 303,324 (1991) (discussing evidence ofhigh
error rates in forensic laboratories, and stating, "[fjorensic experts often present their
findings with great confidence, but infallibility is unfortunately not a characteristic of
forensic laboratories"); Ryan McDonald, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the Weak
Links in the DNA Chain, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 345 (1998) (stating that "[t]he problem
with DNA evidence is no longer one of validity, but one of proficiency").
73 Redmayne, supra note 15, at 1061 (emphasis added). At this point I should note
that I tend to agree that overall error rates may not be all that relevant. See, e.g., David
Balding, Errors and Misunderstandings in the Second NRC Report, 37 JURIMETRICS
J. 469 (1997); Berger, supra note 71, at 1093.
"4 Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, NationalResearch Council,
DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992) [hereinafter NRC 1]. The report had
something for everyone, at least after its contents were subjected to a little spin.
Accordingly, it is cited by both "sides of the v." See Don DeBenedicits, DNA Report
Raises Concerns, 78 A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 20.
" Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update, National Research Council,
The Evaluation ofForensic DNA Evidence (1996) [hereinafter NRC2]. The NRC2 says
NO. See D.H. Kays, DNA, NAS, NRC, DAB, RFLP, PCR, And More: An Introduction
to the Symposium on the 1996NRCReport on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS
J. 395 (1997) (providing a useful discussion of NRC2).
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jury be told anything about "error rates"? 76 Or should we demand some
evidence of actual human error in the particular case before we inject
"possibilities" into the trial? If we are primarily concerned with the
possibility of actual error in the particular case, can the risks be mini-
mized by providing opportunities for reciprocal discovery and testing?
Now that the courts have accepted PCR testing, there should be material
around for the defense to test if it so desires."
In order to get an appreciation of the problem of human error (not to
mention dishonesty) one should read In re an Investigation of the West
Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology Division.78 Reports
of investigations of other crime laboratories are also available on several
forensic web pages on the internet.79
In the case of the West Virginia lab, the operating procedures of the
serology department were found to be deficient in the following particu-
lars:
[ 1 ] no written documentation of testing methodology; [2] no written quality
assurance program; [3] no written internal or external auditing procedures
[4] no routine proficiency testing of laboratory technicians; [5] no technical
76 According to NRC2, prosecutors should not be required to inform the jury of
laboratory proficiency-testing rates. NRC2, supra note 75.
77 Of course, there is the problem of paying for a defense expert. See John Devlin,
Comment, Genetics and Justice: An Indigent Defendant's Right to DNA Expert
Assistance, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 395, 397 (1998) ("[A] DNA expert can assist the
defense team in four important ways. ... First, a DNA expert can review the documents
prepared by the prosecution's testing laboratory to ensure that the lab did not make any
errors, a persistent problem on DNA cases. Second, a defense expert can conduct
independent testing on any unused [DNA] samples to check the results." Third, a
defense expert can testify at trial about the problems with DNA statistics and potentially
offer the jury a lower probability estimate. Fourth, a defense expert can point out the
shortcomings of the newer DNA testing method, if the prosecutor uses it. A defendant
who cannot afford his own expert will lose these benefits unless the government provides
one for him.).
71 190 W. Va. 321, 438 S.E.2d 501 (1993).
71 refer my students to a number of interesting and useful forensic Web sites. De
Paul University Centerfor Law and Science, athttp://www. law.depaul.edu (last visited
Nov. 6, 2000); Scientific Testimony: An Online Journal, (last visited Nov. 6, 2000) at
http://www.scientific.org; Kim Kruglick, Forensic Resource and Criminal Law Search
Site, at http://www.kruglaw.com/lawsearch.htm (last visited Nov. 6,2000); The Evidence
Site, at http://www.law.umich.edu/thayer/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2000).
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review of work product; [6] no written documentation of instrument
maintenance and calibration; [7] no written testing procedures manual; [8]
[a] failure to follow generally accepted scientific testing standards with
respect to certain tests; [9] inadequate record-keeping; and [10] [a] failure
to conduct collateral testing.80
The reader might also profit from a perusal of some common sense
articles on the ways in which error can be injected into evidence collect-
ing, testing, and documentation.8 Forensic scientists may view such
"checklists" as defense lawyers' propaganda and complain that such
laundry lists invite wasteful discovery and harassment. But there are bad
labs as well as good labs. Pointless discovery and harassment are to be
avoided, but counsel cannot afford to take evidence at face value either.
A related problem is the "gee whiz factor." Assuming that we have
an accurate result, and that the expert is not trying to mislead the jury
(which I will discuss as an honesty problem), what is the result going to
mean to the lay jurors? Given their lack of scientific sophistication and
innumeracy, 8 jurors are likely to overestimate the significance of the
result.83 Professor Jonakait provides us with one of his own experiences
with possible juror confusion:
The split verdicts could only be explained by the serological evidence. The
two defendants linked by the forensic scientist to the victim were convicted
'0 In re Investigation of W.V. State Police Crime Lab, 438 S.E.2d at 504.
" See, e.g., Kim Kruglick, A Beginner's Primer on the Investigation of Forensic
Evidence, at http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/kruglick/kruglick.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2000). Kruglick provides the novice with a usefil "Discoverable
Materials Checklist" (laboratory specific, technician specific, and case specific
documentation that should be available to the defense-for example, did you get all of
the laboratory bench notes?) as well as a "Forensic Case Issue Checklist" that suggests
many avenues of attack. See also Paul Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific
Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 791, 795-97 (1991).
82 JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER (1995)
(mathematician author referring to juror confusion with numbers); see also D.H. Kaye
& Jonathan Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL
STS. SOC'Y Series A 75, 77 (1991).
83 See William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical
Evidence In Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy, 11 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 167, 183 (1987); see also "X-Spurt" Witnesses, supra
note 7, at 387-89 (citing sources); Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the
Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 22 (1994).
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.... Such evidence has an important impact on jury verdicts. . . . I
considered whether one in a hundred meant a 99% certainty that Jose was
guilty, or a 99% certainty that the blood came from the victim. 4
Professor Andre Moenssens is of the view that jurors often confuse
issues, assuming that statistical percentages reported by forensic experts
are statements about the probability of guilt." Moenssens contends that
jurors do this despite cautionary instructions,86 and perhaps jurors are
sometimes urged to do this by the fallacious arguments of prosecutors.
C. Honesty Problems
It is no secret that expert witnesses can be "co-opted" by the prosecu-
tion-they may be little more than hired guns of the state.87 Even honest
witnesses who are trying to be objective may not be asked the right
questions and may have their testimony filtered or contorted by the
advocate.8" "Untoward results follow when expert evidence in complex
cases is presented in adversarial fashion: Expert witnesses are manipu-
"See Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 343, 345 (1991).
85 ANDREA. MOENSSENS ETAL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVILAND CRIMINALCASES
583-85 (4th ed. 1995); see Kingsley R. Browne, The Strangely Persistent "Transposition
Fallacy": Why "Statistically Significant" Evidence ofDiscrimination May NotBeSigni-
ficant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437, 437-38 (1998) (discussing the transposition fallacy of equating
"the probability of A given B" with "the probability of B given A," which the author
contends American courts commit in discrimination cases); Richard H. Underwood,
Logic and the Common Law Trial, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 151 (1994) (discussing the
role of fallacy in forensic proof and argument).
86 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 85, at 584-85.
87 WilliamC. Thompson, A Sociological Perspective on the Science ofForensic DNA
Testing, 30U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1997); see Michelle Ketchum, Comment,
Experts: Witnesses for the Persecution? Establishing an Expert Witness 's Bias Through
the Discovery and Admission of Financial Records, 63 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 133 (1994).
I have not found this to be true of good labs and good forensic scientists. For example,
the Associate Medical Examiners in Kentucky pride themselves on being equally
available to the defense as well as the prosecution. Indeed, they are more than happy
to give lectures on forensic science to defense oriented organizations.
88 Of course, this is also true on the defense "side of the v.", and true of expert
witnesses in civil cases. See CAROL JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE,
AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 225 (1994); FRECKELTON, supra note 15, at 3-5, 132-36.
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lated for partisan purposes, some relevant scientific findings are never
introduced, and unwarranted conclusions are not distinguished from valid
research . . . . Forensic scientists have special grievances over the
adversary system. 89 Professor Coady agrees, noting that "[t]he adversary
system is probably the best tool we have for detecting... [overconfi-
dence, self-deception, and dishonesty] ... though, ironically, it is itself
responsible for one common defect, namely, the expert's temptation to
identify overmuch with the cause of his 'side."
'
'
9 0
Good detectives follow the evidence and do not manipulate the
evidence to fit their pre-conceived notions or theories. We all know,
however, that there are bad detectives as well as over-zealous prosecu-
tors.91 Forensic scientist D.H. Garrison, Jr. puts it this way: "Bad science
is what forensic science becomes when an attorney or prosecutor, who
often display[s] all the ethics of a full-grown hamster, get[s] a forensic
scientist to play ball, to get with [the advocate's] program and see [the
advocate's] big picture."92
Sometimes prosecutors will "shop around" until they find an expert
who will tell them what they want to hear. This happened in the infamous
Rolando Cruz case.93
The first lab guy says it's not the boot.... We don't like that answer, so
there's no paper [report]. We go to a second guy who used to do our lab.
He says yes. So we write a report on Mr. Yes. Then Louise Robbins arrives.
This is the boot, she says. That'll be $10,000. So now we have evidence.94
19 Franklin Strier,MakingJury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C.DAvIsL.REv. 95, 113-
15 (1996); see also Peter Sperlich, Scientific Evidence in the Courts: The Disutility of
Adversary Proceedings, 66 JUDICATURE 472,474-75 (1982) (stating, "the greatest single
obstacle to complete and accurate scientific information... is the adversary system").
90 COADY, supra note 13, at 295. Coady proposes, not the abandonment of the
adversary system, but rather some reforms. One suggestion calls for the foundation of
independent institutes of forensic science. Id. at 296. Of course, the trick is to ensure
that the independence is not illusory. Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note 11, at 441.
9' See, e.g., The Liar, supra note 7, at 979.
9 D.H. Garrison, Jr., Bad Science, at http://www.chem.vt.edu/ethics/garrison (last
visited Oct. 30, 2000).
9' 162 Ill. 2d 314, 643 N.E.2d 636 (1994); see also The Liar, supra note 7, at 996.
' Paul Giannelli, Expert Qualifications & Testimony, Conference on Science and
Law, San Diego, Apr. 15, 1999, at 8, at http://www.scientific.org/distribution/law-
review/giannelli.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2000) (quoting a former detective who was
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The same sequence happened in several cases involving police serologist
Fred Zain.9' Under suspicion of faking test results, Zain left his job as
head ofa serology lab in West Virginia to take a position in a Texas crime
lab.96 When the remaining West Virginia lab technicians were unable
to give the prosecutors the results they wanted, they shipped the work off
to Texas to the accommodating Officer Zain. 97 Garrison reports a
variation of"shopping" he calls "Jeopardy" [after a game show], in which
the lab "managers give their subordinates a desired answer and demand
that they come up with the appropriate research questions to support it."
98
Lawyer and criminology Professor William Thompson tells a troubling
tale about DNA.
[Tlhe laboratory report indicated that the DNA test had produced powerful
evidence against both suspects [Thompson's client suspect 1, and suspect
2 who was not his client]-a five locus match between each suspect and the
DNA found in semen extracted from the victim. The report gave no
indication that the evidence against suspect 1 was weaker than that against
suspect 2. ... Examination of the underlying autorads confirmed a clear,
unambiguous match with suspect 2, but indicated the evidence against
suspect 1 was ambiguous and equivocal.... My initial suspicion was...
examiner bias.... When I raised concerns about examiner bias... the
prosecution took the position that the autorads had been scored objectively
by a computer-assisted imaging device. The prosecution claimed a scanner
was used to create a digital image of each autorad ... making the process
entirely objective. ... I obtained a court order that required the forensic
laboratory to re-score the autorads with the computer imaging device while
an independent expert and I watched.... During this re-scoring, the claim
that the process was objective evaporated. ... In order to detect bands in
the male vaginal extract lane that corresponded to those of suspect 1, the
analyst had to increase the sensitivity of the computer to the point that it
detected many additional "bands" that matched neither suspect. The analyst
interviewed by Barry Siegel of the L.A. Times); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed. 2d209 (1993).
9 See discussion infra text at note 109.
9 In re Investigation of W.V. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 190 W. Va.
321, 332, 438 S.E.2d 501, 512 (1993).
9' Id.; see also FRECKELTON, supra note 15, at 123-50; MOENSSENS ET AL., supra
note 85, at 618-20.
9' Garrison, supra note 92.
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then performed a "manual override" of the computer's scoring, instructing
the computer to "delete" (i.e., ignore) all of the bands that matched neither
suspect. When asked to state the basis for "deleting" some bands while
leaving others, the analyst responded that he could tell by looking that the
undeleted bands, which happened to match my client, were "true" bands
while the others were not. A number of the bands he deleted had higher
optical densities than the bands scored as matching my client. So much for
objectivity.99
There are several ways to get people to play ball. Some who cannot
be bought can be persuaded. There are reported cases involving experts
who were pressured to change their results or delete potentially exculpa-
tory results from their reports. " And experts can be steered, or have their
testimony "structured" byprosecutors and police who withhold informa-
tion or feed only selected information to the expert witness.101
Sometimes forensic scientists and bench operators are coached to give
opinions outside of their expertise. Garrison alludes to a case in which
a bartender, who was the victim of a robbery, testified that the defendant
had a glass of beer in his tavern earlier in the evening. Three unwashed
glasses found at the scene of the robbery were tested. Two had prints,
but they did not belong to the defendant. The prosecutor attempted to
get the print examiner to testify that the defendant must have used the
third glass and then wiped it clean.10 2 While Garrison reports that the
print examiner refused to testify, there are reported cases in which similar
testimony appears to have been given. 3
Often the questions that are asked, or not asked, result in misleading
opinion testimony. According to Garrison, prosecutors and defense
9 William C. Thompson, A Sociological Perspective on the Science ofForensic DNA
Testing, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1126-28 (1997).
" Giannelli, supra notes 11, 15 & 94 (citing a number of cases, including Jones v.
City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988)).
01 See JONES, supra note 88, at 217-18; see also John I. Thornton, Uses andAbuses
of Forensic Science, 69 A.B.A. J. 288, 292 (1983); Michael Saks, Accuracy v.
Advocacy: Expert Testimony Before The Bench, TECH. REV. 42,43 (1987) (noting that
the information submitted to the forensic scientist may be selected and screened, and
that such manipulation may result in a skewed opinion).
102 Garrison, supra note 92.
303 Cf United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981).
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lawyers alike try to get experts to provide improper opinions about intent
or absence of intent-questions that must be answered by the jury-by
"disguising a question to [the] expert as something vaguely science-like
in nature."'' For example, a firearms expert has no way of knowing the
intent behind the bullet. But the prosecutor may invite a helpful and
prejudicial comment or two, and some witnesses will accept the invita-
tion. One might profitably compare this sort of thing to some of the
defendant sponsored psychiatric testimony in Dan White's trial (which
involved, among other things, the "Twinkie Defense"), in which the
defense experts frequently "usurped the jurors' prerogative to decide
matters of guilt and innocence."'' 5 The defendant's suspicious reloading
of the gun was an "automatic action," and the defendant "was literally
not focusing" when he shot George Moscone two times in the head."°
Pathologist Michael Baden admits that "'[c]onsistent with' is one of
those catch-all phrases that means [little more than] something could be
possible. It is used a lot ... especially on the witness stand when
evidence can be interpreted in more than one way."'0 7 In the famous
Sacco & Vanzetti case'08 Captain William Proctor, the ballistics expert,
testified:
Q: Have you an opinion as to whether bullet no. 3 was fired from the Colt
automatic which is in evidence [Sacco's pistol]?
A: I have.
Q: And what is your opinion?
A: My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired by that pistol.'
The presiding judge accepted this as if it were a statement that "it was
• . . [Sacco's] pistol that fired the bullet that caused the death of
'04 D.H. Garrison, Jr., Intent Behind the Bullet, at http://www.chen.vt.edu/ethics/
garrison/intent.htm1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
105 Scallen & Wiethoff, supra note 22, at 1163.
'oId. at 1164.
107 MICHAEL BADEN & JUDITH HENNESSEE, UNNATURAL DEATH: CONFESSIONS OF
A MEDICAL EXAMINER 22 (1989); see "X-Spurt" Witnesses, supra note 7, at 394-96.
'" See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 261 Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167, cert. denied, 275 U.S.
574 (1927).
S9 HERBERTB. EHRMAN, THECASETHAT WILLNOTDiE: COMMONWEALTH v. SACCO
& VANZETTI 266 (1969).
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Berardelli."" 0 Later Captain Proctor would give an affidavit that he was
never able to find any convincing evidence to support another expert's
testimony that the bullet was marked with scratches to prove it went
through Sacco's pistol."' He also said he told the district attorney he
would answer "no" if he were asked if he had found any such "affirma-
tive" evidence, but that he had not been asked that question at the trial. "
2
A similar abdication of responsibility occurred in the notorious and
perplexing Dotson-Webb rape case. 113 Forensic scientist Timothy Dixon
testified that seminal material in the victim's panties matched the
defendant's blood type, but the forensic scientist did not disclose that the
victim's own vaginal discharges could have yielded the same results.'
When the scientist was asked later why he had not so testified, he
responded that he was not asked!
Outright lying seems to occur more frequently than one would suspect.
A few bad apples have told outright lies about everything from their
academic credentials to the tests they performed and the results they
obtained. "6
"' The quotation is from the judge's instructions to the jury. EHRMAN, supra note
109, at 268.
... BRIAN JACKSON, THE BLACK FLAG: A LOOK BACK AT THE STRANGE CASE OF
NICOLA SACCO AND BARTOLOMEO VANZETTI 54 (1981).
.. Id. at 23.
"
3 Giannelli, supra note 11, at 467; see also People v. Dotson, 99 Ill. App. 3d 117,
424 N.E.2d 1319 (1981).
"4 Giannelli, supra note 11, at 467-68.
"5 Id. at 468 (citing Blake Fleetwood, From the People Who Brought You the
Twinkie Defense; The Rise of the Expert Witness Industry, 19 WASH. MONTHLY, June
1987, at 33).
" 
6 See Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Ky. 1990) (finding that
the expert witness falsely portrayed himself as a well-credentialed doctor for forensic
psychology); State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 1284, 1285 n.1 (Me. 1979) (The prosecution
introduced testimony of an expert in forensic serology. Investigation of a case unrelated
to the instant case revealed that the expert had reported results of lab tests that he did
not in fact conduct.); State v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Ohio 1978) (The
prosecution's witness, Sergent Richard Zielinski, elevated his level of expertise in drug
analysis, weapon operability, and handwriting analysis. Zielinski later pled guilty to
eight counts of falsification for misstating his academic credentials.).
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Professor Coady alludes to an excerpt from an American cartoon ver-
sion of Robin Hood in criticizing the way lawyers meekly accept the
qualifications of the expert:
Mouse: Who are you?
Fox: I'm Robin Hood.
Mouse: You don't look like Robin Hood, but if you say you are then it
must be true, because Robin Hood wouldn't tell a lie."t 7
Nevertheless, several commentators have offered up collections of
cases involving experts who lied about their credentials. For example,
one firearms expert apparently went so far as to take credit for some
aspect of the development of penicillin and the atomic bomb." ' Lab tech-
nicians have been prosecuted for lying about their academic credentials." 9
On the civil side of the house, Dr. Jeffrey Goltz was recently convicted
of perjury for lying about his credentials in a civil case."0
Perhaps the most spectacular cases of lying involved Fred Zain, the
former Chief of Serology at the West Virginia State Police Crime Labora-
tory, Dr. Ralph Erdmann, a pathologist for forty-two Texas counties, and
the late Dr. Louise Robbins, an anthropologist for hire who is remem-
.". COADY, supra note 13, at 277.
.. See Giannelli, supra note 94, at 5 (citing Starrs, Mountebanks Among Forensic
Scientists, in 2 FoRENsIc SCI. HANDBOOK 1, 7, 20-29 (R. Saferstein ed. 1988)).
9 Id. at 4 (citing State v. Elder, 199 Kan. 607, 608, 433 P.2d 462, 463 (1967)
(involving defendant who stated he received a B.S. in chemistry and bacteriology and
had attended medical school for two years, but no record could be found to indicate his
enrollment or attendance at either institution); State v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1030
(Ohio 1978)); see Giannelli, supra note 11, at 468 n. 175; Moenssens, supra note 9, at
9-10.
n2 Ruth Marcus, Civil Perjury is Prosecuted, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 1998, at A2.
This article reports the perjury conviction and eighteen-month prison sentence of
orthopedic surgeon Jeffrey Goltz. Goltz had clearly lied about his education and training
while testifying as an expert witness in a personal injury case. See Richardson v.
AmTrak, 150 F.R.D. 1,2-3 (D.D.C. 1993) (involving questions about Goltz's testimony
about the operations that he had performed on the plaintiff), af'd, 49 F.3d 760 (D.C.
Cir. 1995). For other misconduct by Dr. Goltz, see Nat 'l Capital Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.C. v. Goltz, 1997 WL 625117, *1 (D. Md. 1997) ("Dr. Goltz knew that [the] plaintiff
was being underpaid but actively concealed this fact by causing false entries to be made
in books and records, and falsely advising [the] plaintiffthat he was being paid in full.").
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bered for her bogus shoeprint and "Cinderella" testimony 121 in a number
of criminal cases, including Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.1
22
The specific acts of misconduct by the pro-prosecution Officer Zain
were enumerated as follows:
[ 1 ] overstating the strength of results; [2] overstating the frequency of genetic
matches on individual pieces of evidence; [3] misreporting the frequency
of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; [4] reporting that multiple
items had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; [5] reporting
inconclusive results as conclusive; [6] repeatedly altering laboratory records;
[7] grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic markers
had been obtained from all samples tested; [8] failing to report conflicting
results; [9] failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to
resolve conflicting results; [ 10] implying a match with a suspect when testing
supported only a match with the victim; and [11] reporting scientifically
impossible or improbable results." 3
For his part, Erdmann became infamous for faking autopsy results-
indeed, generating entirely fake autopsies! '24 In one case, a defendant
attempted to prove that his robbery victim was not harmed and that she
must have died of a heart attack rather than strangulation.'25 The prose-
cution responded with Erdmann's testimony that her coronary arteries
were like those of a thirty-year-old woman. 2 6 To prove his point he
swore that certain microscopic slides were those of the eighty-year-old
12The "Cinderella cases" involved Robbins' claimed ability to match footprints with
the insoles of shoes belonging to suspects. See Giannelli, supra note 11, at 458.
22 509 U.S. 259, 262, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2610, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209, 219 (1993)
(Buckley claimed that, "[a]fter three separate studies by experts... were unable to make
a connection between the print and a pair of boots that [Buckley] had voluntarily
supplied, [prosecutors] obtained a 'positive identification' from... Robbins ... who
was allegedly well known for her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony.").
The case resurfaced and continues to generate controversy because of alleged prosecu-
torial misconduct in the prosecution(s) of Rolando Cruz, another suspect in the same
crime. See "X-Spurt" Witnesses, supra note 7, at 402-03.
" In re Investigation of W.V. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 190 W. Va.
321, 336, 438 S.E.2d 501, 516 (1993).
124 Giannelli, supra note 11, at 449.
'
25Cryil Wecht, Legal Medicine and Forensic Science: Parameters of Utilization
in Criminal Cases, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 797, 809 (1996).
126 Id.
[Vol. 24:149
HeinOnline  -- 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 174 2000-2001
SCIENTIFIC AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE
victim.'27 He did not reveal that he had made the slides from the arteries
taken from the autopsy of a thirty-year-old! 128 In another case Erdmann
amended one of his "findings" after his initial testimony conflicted with
the prosecutor's theory.'29 He originally testified that a bullet hole had
definitely not been made by a small .22 caliber weapon, but the prosecu-
tion built its case around a .22 caliber-so Erdman went back on the stand
after a short recess to say that the bullet hole in the skull was from a .22
caliber that was enlarged by maggots. 30 The defense sat passively.13'
When the testimony was ultimately challenged later at trial, the court
would not allow the jurors to hear the evidence ofblatant contradiction! 3 2
We have already discussed how Dr. Robbins was "for hire" by
prosecutors who were shopping for an expert. Still, Robbins' most
fantastic performance came when she stated that, based on her examina-
tion of a human footprint, the footprint in question was made by a
prehistoric woman who was five and a half months pregnant! 133
Despite the fact that forensic scientists may join, then tout their
memberships in a variety of professional organizations, many of which
have adopted codes of ethics, there is virtually no risk of sanctions from
professional organizations. 131
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the honesty problem is the
complicity of lawyers, particularly prosecutors. If we cannot expect
decency from our prosecutors, 135 what can we expect to get from the other
side of the "v."? Yet the literature is full of cases in which prosecutors
went along with, and in a few cases even solicited, bogus evidence while
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Richard Fricker, Reasonable Doubts, 79 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at 45-46.
130 1d.
131 Id. at 46.
132 Id.
133 Mark Hanson, Believe it or Not, 79 A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 64.
'14 See Giannelli, supra note 11, at 454; L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testi-
mony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1389, 1390 (1995).
135 Cf. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314,
1321 (1935) ("It is as much [the prosecutor's] duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.").
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at the same time withholding exculpatory evidence.'36 This withholding
of exculpatory evidence has been done in spite of prosecutors' constitu-
tional duty to disclose when asked, and despite prosecutors' affirmative
ethical responsibility"3 7 to disclose even in the absence of a triggering
request. 138
When I was looking for articles for my students to read I came across
a piece by former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh. Thomburgh is a
respected politician, and a former governor ofPennsylvania. I would not
have counted him as an ethics expert, although I would not have counted
him out either. When I saw he had written an article onjunk science and
legal ethics,13 9 1 hoped that he had written, ex cathedra, on the subjects
of "junk science" in criminal cases and prosecutorial misconduct. Alas,
my hopes were dashed. He held forth on the subject of the breast implant
cases and hammered the civil plaintiffs' bar! 1
40
D. Lawyer Skills Problems
One of the common complaints of the critics is that lawyers do not
challenge questionable forensic testimony. The testimony may be too
36 See Giannelli, supra note 11, at 440-41; "X-Spurt" Witnesses, supra note 7, at
406-08; The Liar, supra note 7, at 978-80; see also Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor
Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Juris-
prudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887 (1998) (collecting cases).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.8(d) (1999).
'
38 See also Joseph Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement
ofthe Duty ofProsecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
833,898 (1997) (stating that "the disciplinary process has been almost totally ineffective
in sanctioning even egregious Brady violations").
'3 Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science-The Lawyer's Ethical Responsibilities, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 449 (1998). 0
"
4
' See generally id. Mr. Thomburgh is now in private practice in a large law firm.
Of course, in the United States prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for malicious
prosecution, so most of the theorizing about discipline and tort liability for harm caused
by "junk science" tends to focus on plaintiffs' lawyers. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman
& Elizabeth Mertz, Attorneys As Gatekeepers to the Court: The Potential Liability of
Attorneys Bringing Suits Based on Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223 (1998).
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good to be true or even suggest the impossible. In too many cases, the
defense lawyer sits by as silent as the proverbial potted palm.' 4' This is
hardly a new phenomenon. It has been reported that in the infamous
Dreyfus case, the expert testimony of the great criminalist Alphonse
Bertillon incorrectly concluded that the incriminating document passing
French military information to the Germans was written by the innocent
Dreyfus. But Bertillon's testimony (by deposition) was "in fact so
incomprehensible that it escaped cross examination at trial. 1 42 There is
nothing new under the sun.
Law school and CLE skills training cannot solve this problem, but they
can help. Additionally, lawyers can try to brush up on questionable
forensic testimony by consulting some of the available literature. I have
included as Appendix A a good basic bibliography for lawyers and law
students. Practitioners should also consider taking a tour of their local
crime lab. The more adventurous might even try to attend an autopsy.
I have found that state labs generally welcome visitors. Lawyers can also
become familiar with the codes of ethics promulgated by the various
professional associations, 143 and can learn effective techniques for cross-
examination in trial advocacy courses. " For the civil practitioner, I offer
i"" See Giannelli, supra note 94, at 11 (citing cases involving claims of "ineffective
assistance of counsel"). In one case in which a prosecution was dropped because of
conflicting an inconclusive expert testimony, Giannelli reports that "[o]ne ofthe defense
attorneys later admitted, 'I suppose I was like the average citizen. They said it was a
match, I thought it was like a fingerprint."' Id. (quoting Bob Baker & Paul Lieberman,
Faulty Ballistics in Deputy's Arrest: Eagerness to Wake Gun Cited in LAPD Lab Error,
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1989, at 1); see also Symposium, supra note 65, at 637 (The article
quotes Professor Stephen Saltzburg: "[T]he adversary system is largely based on
exposure of weaknesses in witnesses, testimony, and physical evidence through cross-
examination, impeachment, and counter-evidence. Evidence not attacked is evidence
readily accepted.").
142 F. Taroni, C. Champod, & P. Margot, Forerunners of Bayesianism in Early
Forensic Science, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 183, 189 n.23 (1997).
' See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 85, at 91-92. Many of these codes can be
found on the forensic Web sites.
'" For a pre-Daubert article that is still extremely useful see Lee Woldman Miller,
Cross-Examination ofExpert Witnesses: Dispelling the Aura ofReliability, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1073 (1988).
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as Appendix B lawyer Sam Davies'145 excellent outline on how to qualify
an expert under the Daubert-Kumho rules.
"4' Samuel Davies P.S.C., Town Square Place, 230 Knox Street, Barbourville,
Kentucky, 40906, Phone (606) 546-5196.
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Appendix B
Direct Examination Model for Expert Witnessest
Introduction
-Name and Address
-Highest Earned Degree (if allows you to, address the witness as
"Doctor")
Profession (Explain in Lay Terms)
-What it Involves
-How it Relates to this Case
-Length and Extent of Experience
Educational Background 46
-Each Degree, Number of Years to Acquire
-Specific Subjects Related to Case
-Special Training and Certifications
Area of Special Interest Within Profession (Focus of Testimony)
.Description
-Acceptance (Establish Reliable and Recognized Area)
-Experience and Recognition in Special Area
-Relevant Publication
•Resum6 - Other Special Information
Consulting (Testimony) Experience
-Length and Frequency
-Party Alignment or Bias
-Pay Not Dependent on Outcome
t This outline developed by Samuel E. Davies, of Barbourville, Kentucky, and is
used here with permission.
Qualifications: Bass v. Williams, 839 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. App. 1992); Murphy v.
Montgomery Elev. Co., 957 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. App. 1997); Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry.
Co., 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Job in this Case
-How Became Involved
-What Asked to Do (What Was Your Role?)
Note: The Following "determinations" should be made by experts
in any case.
-How the Accident Occurred
-The Product (Procedure) Is Unsafe
-The Defect (Deviation) Caused Injury
-Why the Defect (Deviation) Occurred
-The Injury Was Preventable
Information Reviewed Significant to Opinions in this Case
-List (A written summary will be helpful)
Offer Opinions Within Range of Reasonable Probability Within Area
of Expertise
Description of How the Expert Made Each Determination
(This is "Show-and-Tell" with exhibits, and the experts should establish
the following:)
-Establish How the Accident Occurred
-Rely Upon the Basic Underlying Data and Facts
-Describe With Photos, Drawings, or Models
-Establish the Product (Procedure) Unsafe4 7
(Note: This will establish the "potential" for causation.)
-Rely Upon Basic Concepts, Principles, and Authorities
-Explain and Demonstrate Basic Concepts and Principles
*Refer to Published Authorities
-Compare to Similar Products (Procedures
* Show the Subject is Comparatively More Dangerous
-Use Charts and Drawings to Demonstrate How and Why Unsafe
147 Basic Principles: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167,
143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999); Berry v. City ofDetroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997).
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-Establish Actual Causation as a Result of the Defect (Deviation) 4 '
-Describe the Methodology (Testing, Examination, or Reconstruc-
tion) Specific to this Case
*Establish Methodology Recognized and Reliable
-Use Photos, Videos, Test Data, and Results to Demonstrate
-Establish Substantially Similar if Necessary
-Establish Why the Defect (Deviation) Occurred
(Note: This should establish that the defendant failed to do one or
more of the following:)
-Follow Basic Concepts and Principles
-Follow Appropriate Standards
-Appropriately Test
-Evaluate the Risk
-Warn of the Hazard
-Guard Against the Hazard
-Eliminate the Hazard
Opinion Product Unreasonably Dangerous (Or Deviated From
Accepted Standards)
-Based Upon Background and Work in This Case
Opinion Defect or Deviation Was Cause of Injury'49
-Based Upon Background and Work in This Case
Establish that Safe Alternative Design (Or Procedure) Was Feasible
and Would Have Prevented Injury (Note: This is also "Show-and-
Tell" with Exhibits)
-Explain and Demonstrate How Alternative Feasible and Safe
-Establish Alternative Known and Available
-Describe Methodology Utilized to Establish Safe
s Methodology: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct.
2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993);
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995).
49 Ultimate Opinion: Stinger v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997).
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-Opinion
-Bottom Line: A Safe Design (Procedure) Would have Prevented
the Injury
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